Remote access is the thing attackers want most
So we built the tool as if the relay were already compromised — and then made it something you run yourself, rather than something you have to trust us with.
Most remote-support products terminate your session on the vendor's servers. That is a reasonable engineering choice and an uncomfortable security one: a support tool can view any screen, type anything, and — if it offers privilege escalation — run commands as SYSTEM. The blast radius of a compromise at the vendor is every machine every customer supports.
Secure Desk takes the other route. The technician's console and the supported machine run their own key exchange through the relay and encrypt everything above it, so the relay pairs two sockets and forwards opaque bytes. Both ends dial out, so nobody opens an inbound firewall rule. And because the relay is software you install on your own host, the question "what can the vendor see?" has a short answer.
What it actually does
Attended support from a one-time link, with nothing installed on the user's machine. Unattended access to enrolled devices through a Windows service that works before anyone logs in. A SYSTEM shell that needs no desktop, for the servers where "share your screen" was never the right instruction. Verified file transfer, multi-monitor, two-way clipboard, and a voice call inside the session. Portal identity with TOTP or SSO, three roles, and an audit log.
What it does not do
It does not capture the Windows secure desktop — UAC prompts and Ctrl-Alt-Del stay out of reach, though the sign-in and lock screens are handled. It runs Windows endpoints only. It is not a compliance certificate: it gives you encrypted transport, a scope-reducing relay design and the identity and logging hooks a PCI assessment needs, but validating that assessment is your work and your assessor's. We would rather tell you that here than have you discover it during a rollout.
What we stand for
The relay is not a trusted party
Screen frames, keystrokes, shell bytes and file chunks are encrypted by the endpoints before they leave. Even the relay you run yourself is treated as infrastructure that could be compromised.
You host it, so you can audit it
One Linux host, a PostgreSQL database and a DNS name. No vendor tenancy to trust, no session data leaving your perimeter, and licence checks that verify offline so a network outage is not a lockout.
Support identity is separate from OS identity
Your portal decides who may run a session. The supported machine keeps its own security entirely — we never join, trust, or authenticate against a customer domain to do our job.
Try it on your own hardware
Starter is free forever for one technician. The relay is yours either way.