A remote-support tool can see any screen, type anything, and — with elevation or backstage — run commands as SYSTEM. That makes it one of the most valuable targets in an estate. This page is written so a reviewer can check the claims rather than take them on trust.
Trust boundaries
- The network is untrusted. TLS on every link means an on-path attacker can't read or modify traffic in transit.
- The relay is outside the confidentiality boundary. A relay that terminates TLS could read whatever it forwards — so the endpoints encrypt above it. With end-to-end encryption negotiated, the relay forwards ciphertext it holds no key for.
- The endpoints are the trusted parties. The installed client runs as LocalSystem and is powerful by design. Install it only where intended, and only let authorized technicians pair with it.
- Backstage is the highest-privilege surface. A SYSTEM shell, no user present, nothing on screen. Treat access to it like handing out a remote SYSTEM command prompt.
End-to-end encryption
After pairing, both endpoints generate an ephemeral ECDH P-256 key pair and exchange public keys through the relay. The shared secret goes through HKDF-SHA256, salted with the session id, to derive AES-256-GCM keys — one per direction. Frames, input, shell bytes and file chunks are encrypted before they leave either endpoint.
Both ends display a 6-digit short authentication string derived from the agreed keys. Comparing it out of band — say it to the user — detects a man-in-the-middle, including a malicious relay. Compare it before using backstage or elevation. The session token remains the pairing secret for joining the socket; it isn't the HKDF salt.
Three identity planes that never mix
| Plane | Credential | Decides |
|---|---|---|
| Portal | Password + enforced TOTP, or SSO through Microsoft Entra / Google | Who may run support sessions, and in what role |
| Session | A one-time session token, an enrolled device token, or a short-lived console grant | Which socket may join which session |
| Target | Whatever context the client already runs in — the signed-in user, or LocalSystem | What the session can do on the target; more rights need that machine's own admin account |
The consequence worth stating plainly: compromising the portal does not grant OS access to any client, and operating a client never exposes portal identities or customer domain secrets. Secure Desk never joins, trusts or authenticates against a customer's domain.
Portal accounts
Local accounts are gated until they enroll TOTP — on by default — with recovery codes issued once and stored only as hashes. SSO delegates the second factor to your identity provider; domain-allowlisted auto-provisioning drops a new SSO user into the read-only viewer role. Passwords are scrypt-hashed; sessions use HttpOnly, SameSite cookies.
Socket authorization
The relay validates the session id format and secret token against the portal's registry with constant-time comparisons, honours expiry, and consumes one-time links when their session ends.
Elevation
When more rights are needed, the technician is prompted for that machine's own administrator account. It's used once, on that box, for a linked-token launch — never persisted, never logged, never sent to the portal, and with end-to-end encryption never visible to the relay. The worker reports the integrity level actually obtained.
PCI-DSS considerations
PCI-DSS compliance is a property of an environment and an organization's processes, validated by an assessor. Software can't be compliant on its own. Nothing here is a compliance claim.
Secure Desk provides:
- TLS on every link, with TLS 1.2 as a floor and an AEAD-only cipher list when the relay terminates TLS itself (Req. 4).
- Per-session identity and per-user portal accounts with MFA (Req. 7, 8).
- Connect, disconnect, pair and file-transfer events as logging points (Req. 10).
You provide:
- Shipping those events to tamper-evident, time-synced central logging with retention, monitoring and alerting.
- Certificate and key provisioning, rotation and protection (Req. 3, 4).
- Patching, hardening and access control on the relay host and every endpoint host (Req. 5, 6, 7).
- Network segmentation that positions the relay to minimize CDE scope.
- Deciding who may be an operator at all — backstage is available to anyone who can open a session on the installed service, roles don't isolate it, and its commands aren't logged.
- Documentation, change control and the SAQ or ROC with your assessor.
HIPAA
Rubix designs products with HIPAA safeguards in mind (such as access controls, encryption and auditability). That isn't a representation that Secure Desk is “HIPAA certified” or that a deployment satisfies a covered entity's obligations. Where Rubix acts as a business associate, a Business Associate Agreement is available when applicable — contact sales@rubixtechnology.com.
What the product deliberately doesn't do
- It doesn't capture the Windows secure desktop (UAC prompts and Ctrl+Alt+Del).
- There's no consent prompt on the client for an enrolled device. The portable client is inherently consensual; an installed service is not, by design. If you need per-session approval on managed machines, build that policy around the tool.
- Backstage commands are not logged, and roles don't isolate backstage per technician.
Hardening checklist
- Leave TLS certificate validation enabled in the client. Fix self-signed certificates rather than disabling the check.
- Prefer the portable client. Reserve the installed service, and especially backstage, for cases that need unattended, pre-login or SYSTEM access.
- Keep join tokens out of logs and tickets.
- Rate-limit and monitor the relay: per-IP connection limits, maximum sessions, maximum message size.
- Change every default. Anything set by hand during evaluation shouldn't survive into production.
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